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The Public Interest and
Governing Boards of Nonprofit
Health Care Institutions
Robin Dimieri* and Stephen Weiner**
I. INTRODUCTION
A significant amount of recent activity in health care policy
has focused on supplanting regulatory intervention in the alloca-
tion and pricing of health care services with legislative strategies
that will promote competitive markets.' Among those activities
facing particular scrutiny are state programs to review and approve
hospital budgets and rates,2 federally mandated certificate-of-need
programs that review and approve substantial capital expenditures
and new services undertaken by health care providers,' and utiliza-
tion review conducted by professional standards review organiza-
tions.4 Proponents of competition strategies are concerned princi-
pally with performance issues including whether regulation can
fairly correct misdistributions in health care services, curb the po-
tential for excessive demand, and control increases in the costs of
providing services. 5
While it is worthwhile to examine the performance of regula-
tory programs in terms of their manifest functions, these endeav-
* Attorney at Westcott & Nolan, Boston, Massachusetts. B.A., 1968, Hamline Univer-
sity; M.A., 1972, Brown University; J.D., 1975, Boston University.
** Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston
University School of Law. A.B., 1964, Harvard College; L.L.B., 1968, Yale University.
1. See, e.g., Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-79, § 103, 93 Stat. 594-95; National Healthcare Reform Act of 1980, H.R. 7527,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
2. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-73a to -73t (West 1977 & Supp. 1980);
MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. §§ 568H-568Z (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6A,
§§ 37-44 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-1 to -4.1, -9, -10, -12, -14, -18, 17:48-7
(West Supp. 1980-81); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2801, 2801-c, 2803, 2803-b, 2804, 2805,
2805-a, 2805-g, 2806, 2807, 2807-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1980-81); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.39.010-.910 (1975 & Supp. 1981).
3. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
4. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320C-1 to -22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
5. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SocIAL STRUCTURE 73-138 (2d ed. 1968).
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ors sometimes neglect the latent functions6 fulfilled by regulatory
agencies. For one thing, health care institutions are regulated pri-
marily by public or quasi-public agencies, and the public nature of
this regulation in itself promotes key values. Regulatory programs
in the health care industry are ultimately accountable to legislative
policies and purposes. Regardless of whether this accountability
derives directly from the legislature or through intermediation of
judicial review, the result is that health care providers and insurers
operate within a defined set of objectives that, at least in theory,
represents an intricate balancing of sometimes quite diverse inter-
ests. The outcome of this balancing in a public forum generally is
perceived as legitimate because it is achieved through the political
process in a manner consistent with the democratic structure of
our society.7
Furthermore, the reliance on regulation to develop and imple-
ment policy affecting health care institutions offers consumers and
providers alike an opportunity to participate directly in policymak-
ing processes through devices such as public hearings and notice
and comment procedures for promulgating regulations.8 Regulation
also facilitates consumer access to information about the operation
of health care institutions that is publicly disclosed in regulatory
filings. If this information is not routinely disclosed, the public
may obtain it through "Freedom of Information" statutes.9
Public regulation can also be an effective means of attaining
cost-containment objectives, in large part because government
functions as a major payor in the system.10 For the twelve-month
period ending in March 1980, federal, state, and local governments
funded forty percent of all personal health care expenditures"" and
6. Id.
7. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Weiner, Public Values on Private
Regulation: Some Reflections on Cost Containment Strategies (forthcoming in MmBA K
MEMORIAL FUND Q.).
8. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ 2-3 (West 1979).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 4, § 7 1 26 (West 1976); id. ch. 66,
§ 10 (West Supp. 1981). Privileged or confidential trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person are exempt from disclosure under the Federal Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA, however, does not create a private cause of action to
enjoin disclosure of information that may fall within any of its exemptions, and federal
agencies may disclose cost reports submitted by Medicare providers. See Parkridge Hoesp.,
Inc. v. Califano, 625 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1980); Humana of Va., Inc. v. Blue Cross, Inc., 622
F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1980).
10. The term "payors" is used to include both the individual users who pay for ser-
vices out of pocket and the "third-party" payors, such as commercial insurance companies,
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
11. See National Health Expenditures and Related Measures for the Year Ending in
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fifty-six percent of all hospital care expenditures. 12 Moreover, the
percentage of hospital care expenditures, as well as all personal
health care expenditures, funded directly through public sources
has steadily increased over the last five years. The share of public
funding of hospital care expenditures rose from fifty-four percent
in 1976 to fifty-six percent in 1980.18 The public has also directly
or indirectly funded hospitals and other health care institutions
through federal loans for construction,14 federal loans and grants to
medical schools and students in professional health training pro-
grams,' 5 lost governmental revenue because of tax exemptions for
charitable institutions,16 and tax deductions for medical expendi-
tures.17 Because of its role as payor, government's interest in cost
containment necessarily will remain strong. Furthermore, since
regulation heretofore has been the principal mode for achieving
cost containment, public accountability, public participation, and
public access to information appear to be reasonably well en-
trenched as effectual elements in cost control efforts.
Within competitive models, private regulatory relationships
replace public ones. Instead of a public agency imposing resource
constraints on private providers, these constraints either are self-
imposed or are enforced by other private parties and mechanisms
such as health care plans. In neither case is a public agency avail-
able to ensure that private responses to resource constraints are
consistent with the public interest. The competitive models assume
that a market in which consumers are free to choose among health
care plans will ipso facto serve the public interest. It is not likely,
however, that every consumer will find a plan or provider that re-
flects both his or her economic and noneconomic values. Moreover,
it is not necessarily the case, at least for the foreseeable future,
that competitive plans or providers will produce an array of
choices that most appropriately maximize the public benefit in a
March 1980, HEALTH CARE FINANCING TRENDS, Summer 1980, at 5. The federal government
funds 28% of all personal health care expenditures, and state and local governments fund
12% of these expenditures.
12. Id. Forty-one percent (41%) of hospital care expenditures are funded by the fed-
eral government and fifteen percent (15%) are funded by state and local governments.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 292 to 295g-10 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
16. 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3) (1976 & Supp. I1 1980).
17. Greenspan & Vogel, Taxation and Its Effects Upon Public and Private Health
Insurance and Medical Demand, HsATH CARE FINANCING RV., Spring 1980, at 39. The
authors estimated that tax revenue foregone by the federal government due to tax deduc-
tions for health insurance alone would amount to $10.6 billion in 1980. Id. at 40.
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perceptibly legitimate fashion.
The question, then, is how one can ensure in a system charac-
terized primarily by private competitive relationships, that private
responses to constraint are consistent with the public interest and
that the public has an opportunity to participate in the decisions
that produce these responses. A critical issue in such a system is
the extent to which health care institutions have developed effec-
tive corporate governance mechanisms that allow the public to
help shape institutional policies. This Article specifically considers
whether the existing legal system permits corporate governance
mechanisms to function in a manner that promotes the public in-
terest, particularly the public's interest in disclosure and participa-
tion in institutional policy development. The Article focuses on the
viability of corporate governance structures in the health care
industry, with special emphasis on the nonprofit hospital
corporation.18
The Article begins with an overview of the issue of role rever-
sal between management and directors of nonprofit corporations.
The manifestations of role reversal are seen in the trend in non-
profit corporations toward excessive delegation of board powers to
executive committees, the elimination of the potential for indepen-
dent control over the board of directors by the absence of member-
ship requirements for nonprofit corporations, and abuse of the
power to alter the charters and bylaws of these corporations, par-
ticularly with respect to the size and composition of the board of
directors.
The Article argues that a principal reason for the reversal of
the direction of managerial control is the insufficient development
18. Hospitals are the most visible institution in the health care system, and voluntary
nonprofit entities are the predominant form of hospital organization, accounting for approx-
imately 70% of all nonfederal short-term general and other special hospital beds. See AMER.
ICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 4-7 (1980). The 1979 survey data in this
volume indicate that approximately 9% of all hospital beds in the United States are in
federal hospitals; 19% are in nonfederal psychiatric, tuberculosis, and other special and
long-term general hospitals; and 72% are in nonfederal short-term general and other special
hospitals. The form of ownership is not delineated for the second group of hospitals, but
among the nonfederal short-term general and other special hospitals 70% of the beds are
accounted for by nongovernmental, nonprofit hospitals, 8% are accounted for by investor-
owned (for-profit) hospitals, and 22% of the beds are found in state and local governmental
hospitals. In addition to their predominance in the health care system, voluntary nonprofit
hospitals are the focus of this Article because they are typically organized as nonprofit or
charitable corporations pursuant to state nonprofit corporation enabling acts, although occa-
sionally nonprofit hospitals may be organized as unincorporated trusts. 2A HosPITAL LAW
MANUAL, Governing Board § 1.
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in the nonprofit sector of statutory and judicial remedies to enforce
the supervisory role of the board of directors. The Article contends
that statutory mechanisms to ensure the board's accountability to
the membership are inadequate, if not nonexistent. Since nonprofit
corporation statutes allow for a situation in which control need not
be extended beyond the corporation's original promoters, it is sub-
mitted that the definition of "members" in these statutes do not
adequately protect the public interests that health care institutions
serve.
Given this analysis, the Article concludes that the statutory
framework for nonprofit corporations must be refined for the pur-
poses of health care institutions, principally hospitals, so that the
direction of managerial control rests squarely with the board of di-
rectors; so that the membership of nonprofit corporations is
broadly defined; and so that the functions of the members are
analogous to those of shareholders in the for-profit sector. This Ar-
ticle regards these reforms as critical in an environment in which
private regulation is widely believed to be an effective and desira-
ble alternative to public health care regulation. Without them the
public interest cannot be protected in a competitive system.
II. CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
A. A Critique of the Present System
That problems exist with the governance of many nonprofit
health care institutions is a declaration made by an increasing
number of individuals concerned about the future of the health
care industry. In a recent essay,1' one such commentator, Professor
Robert Clark, raised a number of issues concerning the governance
of nonprofit hospitals that relate to the focus of this Article. While
both Clark and the authors of this Article have similar concerns
about the state and direction of hospital governance, 0 Clark ap-
proached the problems raised by nonprofit dominance from a per-
spective that is different from the one used in this Article. Despite
this difference, it is useful to examine Clark's analysis to under-
stand the magnitude of the issues arising from the management of
nonprofit health care corporations today.
Clark suggested that nonprofit hospitals may be operationally
inefficient, that they are imprecise in the manner in which they
19. Clark, Does the Non-profit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1417 (1980).
20. Id.
10331981]
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respond to demands for service, and that they promote costly
"high technology medical care."'" Clark proposed two alternative
hypotheses-'"voluntary" and "elitist"-to explain the economic
behavior of nonprofit hospitals. Both hypotheses presume that
hospitals function as minigovernments to the extent that they en-
gage in the production of public goods and exact "taxes" from pa-
tients and donors. The "taxpayer" is defined as either a patient, a
third-party payor acting in a patient's behalf, or a donor who pays
for hospital services that benefit some other individuals or the
public at large. 2
The voluntary hypothesis posits that hospitals acting as
minigovernments in fact explain their cross-subsidization program
to consumers, disclose their redistribution programs (i.e., free care,
research programs, and teaching activities), allow consumers a role
in selecting managers, and consider adjusting charges to customers
who prefer to pay a greater or lesser amount of the "tax." 23 The
elitist hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that those who control
hospitals act as an elitist government. They charge for services at
rates that will allow funds to be directed toward research, teaching,
and favored departments and patients. They do not fully disclose
or advertise this practice, and they do not provide consumers with
any real choices, either by differential pricing or by permitting
consumers to participate in the redistribution decisions. The elitist
hypothesis concludes that those who control nonprofit hospitals
operate as an "undemocratic ruling class with respect to the hospi-
tal's minigovernmental functions.' ' 4
Clark found some support for the elitist hypothesis as the bet-
ter explanation for the economic behavior of nonprofit hospitals, in
part because nonprofits engage more frequently than for-profit
hospitals in cross-subsidization practices and because nonprofits
often inadequately disclose their "taxation" policies. Clark also
concluded that nonprofit hospitals' minigovernmental activities are
determined by an elitist group of individuals who tend to perpetu-
ate their control by selecting their successors.25
The issue of control in the nonprofit hospital was explored
more fully by Clark in a parallel hypothesis (the "exploitation" hy-
pothesis) which suggested that control is more often exercised out
21. Id. at 1417-19.
22. Id. at 1433, 1437-41.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1439.
25. Id. at 1465-66.
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of self-interest than out of any sense of fiduciary responsibilities."
While the supporting data are unclear, Clark found some support
for the exploitation hypothesis in the existence of significant incen-
tives for physicians to exploit the nonprofit hospital for their own
personal financial and professional gain. In this connection, physi-
cians might successfully manipulate the nonprofit institutions'
favorable public image for their own benefit.2 7 This practice dimin-
ishes the likelihood that nonprofit hospitals will either disclose re-
distribution programs and cross-subsidization practices or allow
consumers a role in selecting the hospitals' officers and directors.2 8
Clark's conclusions are consistent with the findings of other
commentators insofar as they assert that physicians and managers
of nonprofit health care institutions exercise an inordinate degree
of control over matters that the corporation's directors and mem-
bers traditionally have commanded. 29 As a partial explanation for
directors' dereliction of their duties, Clark noted that few incen-
tives exist for directors of nonprofit hospitals to exercise control
over hospital managers.30 Nevertheless, directors of nonprofit hos-
pital corporations theoretically remain responsible for directing
managers of the corporation, and the directors may not neglect
their fiduciary duty to participate actively in the management of
corporate affairs.3 1 In view of this criticism of the roles now played
by many directors of nonprofit corporations, Clark's inquiry into
the operational activities of nonprofit hospitals should be ex-
tended. It is important to consider why physicians and managers
26. The notion of the fiduciary character of nonprofit organizations was suggested in
the work of Henry Hansmann, who argued that nonprofit corporations have developed as a
response to "contract failure." "Contract failure" arises when a consumer is unable to im-
pose adequate constraints on an institution by the ordinary mechanism of direct and private
contract. In industries providing complex, personal services of a nonstandardized nature,
such as the health care industry, it is difficult for the consumer to determine whether ser-
vices are performed competently. In such industries nonprofits arise as a response to con-
sumer distrust of ordinary contractual remedies to control quality, and the consumer takes
advantage of the "nondistribution constraint" characteristic of nonprofit organizations to
impose additional constraints upon organizational behavior. See Hansmann, The Role of
Non-profit Enterprises, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). Hansmann qualified the analysis by ex-
plaining that hospitals seem to represent an unusual case and that other factors-chiefly the
historical development of the hospital industry-explain the emergence of nonprofit hospi-
tals as the prevalent form of organization. Id. at 866-68.
27. Clark, supra note 19, at 1433-37.
28. Id. at 1465-71.
29. See notes 36-40 infra and accompanying text.
30. Clark, supra note 19, at 1445.
31. W. KNEPPER, LiAnxIrrY oF CORORATE OFFI ERS AND DIRECTORS § 9.09 (3d ed.
1978).
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are able to exercise such expansive control. It is the hope of this
Article that by examining the management issues in nonprofit
health care corporations and the statutory framework for their reg-
ulation, the answers can be found to two more central ques-
tions-namely, whether the nonprofit corporate governance mech-
anisms can sustain a level of public accountability and
participation in a competitive environment and whether the mech-
anisms can function in a manner consistent with the public
interest.
B. The Nature of the Problem
The board of directors of a nonprofit corporation is responsi-
ble for setting institutional policies and monitoring the implemen-
tation of those policies on a regular basis.32 Because the activities
of nonprofit corporations can significantly affect the public inter-
est, directors of such institutions have recently become the focus of
much debate. Some observers have charged that many directors of
nonprofit corporations inadequately fulfill their responsibilities.33
Other commentators, however, while agreeing with the assessment
that many directors have been laggard, have observed changes in
the boards of nonprofit corporations in recent years.3 ' These com-
mentators argue that some boards are in fact assuming their re-
sponsibilities, in part because they are motivated by the fear that
legal sanctions for the breach of their fiduciary duties may be im-
posed upon them. While this latter perspective is no doubt true for
some boards, it is nevertheless the case that many directors fre-
quently fail even to recognize that they are obliged to oversee the
management of the corporation. Often the board of directors of a
nonprofit corporation restricts its functions to perfunctory ap-
proval of management proposals and, when necessary, the selection
32. Anthony, Can Nonprofit Organizations Be Well Managed?, 37 VITAL SPEEcHES OF
THE DAY 442, 443 (1971); see Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Natl Training School for Deacon-
esses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974).
33. R. ANTHONY & R. HERzLiNGER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN NoN-PRoFrr ORGANIZA-
TIONS 66-68 (1975). The authors cite a study of 7,000 board actions recorded in the minutes
of the board meetings of 19 public colleges and universities. The study found that a mere
6% of the board decisions were planning decisions. Most of the board actions were routine
in nature, and a substantial percentage of the routine decisions were ratifications of deci-
sions already made by the administration. Id. at 67. The directors of nonprofit hospital
corporations have also failed to respond adequately to their supervisory roles. See Donnelly,
The Trustee as Steward for the Community and the Sponsor, HosPrrAL PROGRESS, July
1979, at 62; Ford, Business Not as Usual in Hospitals, HosPrrALS., Apr. 1, 1980, at 159.
34. R. ANTHONY & R. HERzLINGER, supra note 33, at 68.
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of a new corporation president.3 5
Reports of an inappropriate reversal of the supervisory role of
the board of directors and the management functions of corporate
officers and employees evidence the fact that nonprofit boards
often do not exercise the full scope of their authority.36 The direc-
tion of overall managerial control sometimes ceases to flow from
the board and emanates instead from the corporate officers and
other managerial employees. The "capture" of the board by man-
agement may arise in the common arrangement in which the mem-
bers of the corporation, who are the functional equivalent of share-
holders, are also the officers and employees of the corporation. 7
This situation creates dual power groups in the board and the
management. The balance of power resides in management, how-
ever, since it in fact elects the board of directors. Such an arrange-
ment is often accompanied by the presence of either a manage-
ment-dominated board executive committee or an independent
administrative committee comprised of managers who assume the
board's responsibilities.3
An even more unfortunate situation arises when either the
corporation has no members or the articles of incorporation pro-
vide that the board of directors is coterminous with the corpora-
tion's membership. The absence of an effective membership means
that the "watchdog" function of shareholders, minimal though it
may be, is nonexistent and that no independent group is empow-
ered to elect the board of directors. Self-perpetuation of the ex-
isting board and the appointment of friendly successors inevitably
results from this type of an arrangement." A self-perpetuating
board of directors in turn naturally exacerbates the possibility of
role reversal beween management and the board, since control of
the board is more easily "captured" when the directors need not
account for their actions to a membership that elects them.40
35. Anthony, supra note 32, at 443.
36. Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and the New Non-Profit Corporations Laws, 20
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 145, 162-63 (1971).
37. Id. at 162-63, 167-68.
38. Id.
39. Taft, Control of Foundations and Other Non-Profit Corporations, 18 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 478, 482 (1969).
40. While it is difficult to document the extent of self-perpetuation accompanied by
role reversal, the leading legal commentator in the field of nonprofit corporations estimates
that approximately one-half of all nonprofit organizations are dominated by individuals or
small groups who seek their own advantage from this affiliation. Oleck, supra note 36, at
165. See also Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 962
(1979), which suggests that in the past decade lawyers, state legislatures, and state adminis-
10371981l
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Two other trends in the governance of nonprofit corporations
tend to support the observation that boards of directors of non-
profit corporations often fail to fulfill properly their supervisory
functions. First, executive and other board committees are too fre-
quently relied upon to do work that is the responsibility of the
entire board.-One commentator has noted that nonprofit organiza-
tions inappropriately rely upon committees more often than busi-
ness organizations. 1 Second, in nonprofit corporations the power
to amend the corporate bylaws may reside solely in the board.42 If
a small group or an individual gains control of the board, the size
and composition of the board can be easily manipulated to pre-
serve that control through a board-approved amendment to the ar-
ticles or the bylaws.43
The overall effect of these trends is to create weak links in the
structure of accountability in nonprofit corporations. An ineffective
accountability structure is in turn responsible at least in part for
the mediocre management practices with which nonprofit organi-
zations have become associated. 4 There are, however, other
problems inherent in an attempt to manage nonprofit organiza-
tions efficiently and effectively. These problems include the ab-
sence of the profit motive as a measure of performance, the dimin-
ished impact of market forces, the dominance of professionals
within management, and the effect of donor behavior on corporate
planning.
The profit margin in proprietary organizations provides a
readily available criterion for determining the organization's effi-
ciency and effectiveness.45 The nonprofit organization, however,
cannot use a single criterion for measuring both aspects of per-
formance, since economic efficiency is not invariably consistent
with the most effective means of achieving the organization's pur-
poses. Moreover, performance evaluation of service-related indus-
tries is difficult even in the for-profit sector because the quality of
services cannot easily be measured.
trative agencies have not changed the manner in which they treat nonprofit organizations.
41. Oleck, supra note 36, at 156-62, 166.
42. See notes 94-114 infra and accompanying text.
43. Taft, supra note 39, at 483-84.
44. Anthony, supra note 32, at 442-43.
45. R. ANTHONY & R. HERZLINGER, supra note 33, at 35-38. The authors also note that
profits are not a panacea for measuring performance in the for-profit sector, because they
tend to measure current rather than long-run performance, they fail to compare actual per-
formance with the potential level of profit, and they are dependent upon discretionary
choices made among various accounting techniques.
1038 [Vol. 34:1029
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The diminished impact of market .forces upon management
choices also complicates the management of nonprofit organiza-
tions. For-profit organizations invariably increase profits when the
number of customers increases. Nonprofit organizations, however,
do not necessarily benefit from increased demand, particularly if
the organizations' incomes are fixed by endowment or annual giv-
ing, or if third-party payors reimburse the organizations on a cost-
per-unit-of-service basis regardless of volume.46 In addition, be-
cause demand is not an accurate measure of success and perform-
ance is difficult to measure, nonprofit managers may be influenced
by their personal assessments of organizational goals and appropri-
ate resource utilization.'7
The role of professionals in nonprofit organizations such as
health care institutions contributes to the complexity of the man-
agement task. In many nonprofit organizations two parallel lines of
management coexist-one consisting of the professional provider
staff and the other consisting of managers.48 The number of lateral
components in the organization thus creates a staggering supervi-
sory responsibility for any board of directors. Furthermore, profes-
sional providers are trained to exalt certain values and skills that
may be antithetical to the management process. These values and
skills include a tendency to measure achievement in accordance
with professional standards promoted by an outside organization; a
desire to remain in the practice of the profession rather than to
devote full-time attention to management activities; a preference
for working independently; inadequate training in or appreciation
of management skills; and a tendency to give inadequate consider-
ation to the financial implications of their activities.' 9
Managers of nonprofit organizations must also consider the in-
fluence of donors on the fiscal policies of the organization. Few in-
centives exist for the nonprofit organization to refuse to accept do-
nations for capital expenditures that do not fulfill the specific
needs of the institution. Donors tend to prefer edifices that will
become visible symbols of their generosity. Yet such a gift requires
46. Vladeck, Why Non-Profits Go Broke, 42 PuB. INTEREsT 86, 91-92 (1976).
47. R. ANTHONY & R. HEmZLINGER, supra note 33, at 44-45.
48. Selby, Better Performance from 'Nonprofits', 56 HARv. Bus. Rnv. Sept.-Oct. 1978,
at 92, 98. See also Rushing, Differences in Profit and Nonprofit Organizations: Study of
Effectiveness and Efficiency in General Short Stay Hospitals, 19 AD. SCL Q. 474, 476-77
(1974). Rushing suggests that decisionmaking in for-profit hospitals is simpler than in non-
profit hospitals because the investor-owners in for profit hospitals are often physicians and
the number of competing interests that the board must satisfy is reduced.
49. R. ANTHONY & R. HERLINGER, supra note 33, at 46-48.
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the institution to carry operating expenses in support of the capital
expenditure. The operating expenses in turn place unnecessary
financial pressures on the institution.50 Moreover, nonprofit organi-
zations tend to reward donors by making them directors-often
without regard to the donor's qualifications for the position.
Managing a nonprofit organization, then, is a demanding task.
A well-managed nonprofit organization requires sophisticated tech-
niques of accounting, including the development of program and
responsibility structures and systematic performance evaluation. It
demands well-designed pricing policies, cost accounting, use of ac-
crual accounting, and review of the constant emphasis on output
measures. It also requires better compensation for senior manage-
ment and a reward system for good management at all levels.5 1
First and foremost, however, it must be understood that a
nonprofit organization cannot be managed well unless the board of
directors (or the equivalent governing body in entities not organ-
ized as corporations) gains ascendancy in the organizational struc-
ture. The board must take an active role in establishing an ac-
countability structure, overseeing management activities, and
conducting long-range institutional planning. 2 Arguably, the com-
plexity of the management process in nonprofit organizations ne-
cessitates a more vigorous corporate governance structure than one
might find in the for-profit sector.53 If a functional governance sys-
tem exists, many of the needed managerial reforms will be the nat-
ural result of the supervisory activities of a highly skilled and ef-
fective board of directors.
HI. NONPROFIT CORPORATION STATUTES
In light of the conclusions set forth in the preceding section,
the question arises whether the existing statutory requirements for
forming and operating nonprofit corporations are sufficient to en-
sure the kind of corporate accountability necessary to achieve ef-
fective and efficient nonprofit management, or whether they have
in fact contributed to the present widespread lack of responsibility
among boards of directors. An examination of the legal constraints
on managerial activities must therefore be undertaken to deter-
mine whether the legal system actually encourages or discourages
50. Vladeck, supra note 46, at 93-94, 99-101.
51. See R. ANTHONY & R. HERZLINGER, supra note 33, at 315-48.
52. Ellman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 1979 Amz. ST. L.J. 153.
53. R. ANTHONY & R. HERZLINGER, supra note 33, at 67.
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accountability in the governance structure. Additionally, an exami-
nation of the provisions of typical nonprofit corporation statutes
and relevant case law is necessary to determine whether the per-
ception that legal sanctions may ensue from irresponsible board
actions is valid.
A. Overview
The term "nonprofit organization" is used in the most general
sense to mean an organization in which "no part of the income or
profit is distributed to its members, directors, or officers."" Some
commentators distinguish between "nonprofit" and "not for profit"
organizations on the ground that nonprofit organizations may earn
a "profit" (surplus) so long as the proceeds are returned to the or-
ganization and used for the purposes for which the organization
operates.5 The more widely held view, however, is that the dis-
tinction between "nonprofit" and "not for profit" is largely aca-
demic,58 because in any case profits may not be distributed among
the members of the corporation except upon dissolution of certain
noncharitable organizations 57  and in other very limited
circumstances.5 8
The nonprofit corporation falls within the rubric of nonprofit
organizations. It exists in some form in every jurisdiction,59 and
many states have enacted specific nonprofit corporation statutes.
54. Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, supra note 40, at 962.
55. Pasley, Organization and Operation of Non-Profit Corporations-Some General
Considerations, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 239, 241 (1970). It should be noted that in any event
"profits" may be distributed indirectly through salaries and other intangible benefits that
may accrue to members. These indirect distributions may be made without violating the
principles underlying the nondistribution constraint.
56. Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, supra note 40, at 963-64.
57. If an organization is charitable in nature the assets must be distributed upon dis-
solution to a charity with a similar purpose. In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203
(1973). If an organization is not charitable in nature the assets may be distributed among
the members upon dissolution. In re Los Angeles County Pioneer, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 862, 257
P.2d 1, 7 (1953).
58. In New York a nonprofit corporation may issue subvention certificates in exchange
for voluntary capital contributions and may make periodic payments to the certificate hold-
ers in an amount that does not exceed two-thirds of the maximum interest rate authorized
by the New York General Obligations Law. N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFrr CORP. LAW §§ 504-505
(McKinney 1970).
59. Historically, the nonprofit corporation preceded the business corporation. Non-
profit corporation statutes appeared in the colonial period of American history. In recent
times, however, the nonprofit corporation statutes have become stepchildren of the business
corporation laws, and the provisions of nonprofit statutes are frequently characterized as
sketchy and confusing. Hailer, The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, 9 BAYLOR L. REV.
309 (1951); Rooney, Maitland and the Corporate Revolution, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 24 (1951).
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These statutes ordinarily define a nonprofit corporation as a corpo-
ration in which no part of the corporation's income is distributed
to its members, directors, or officers.60 The Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act (the Model Act), as well as some state statutes, fur-
ther provide that nonprofit corporations may be formed for any
lawful purpose,"' or for a business purpose,62 so long as the non-
distribution constraint is preserved.
Many nonprofit corporation statutes limit the purposes for
which nonprofit corporations may be formed. 3 The most common
of these limitations confines corporate activities to those that fur-
ther charitable purposes. Charitable purposes are typically ones
that serve to relieve poverty, advance religion and education, pro-
mote health, and further governmental or municipal objectives,
and that benefit either the general public or some indefinite class
60. Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, supra note 40, at 962-63.
61. ABA MODEL NoNPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 4 (rev. ed. 1964); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.117 (1973). The MODEL NoNPROIrr CORPORATION AcT § 4, provides:
Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purpose or purposes, in-
cluding, without being limited to, any one or more of the following purposes: Charita-
ble; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic; political; religious; social;
fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural; horticultural; animal hus-
bandry; and professional, commercial, industrial or trade association; but labor unions,
cooperative organizations, and organizations subject to any of the provisions of the in-
surance laws of this State may not be organized under this Act.
62. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CoRP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 1970). This provision states
that "Type C" not-for-profit corporations "may be formed for any lawful business purpose
to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective."
63. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 4 (West Supp. 1981). A nonprofit corpo-
ration may be formed in Massachusetts for one or more of the following purposes:
(a) for any civic, educational, charitable, benevolent or religious purpose;
(b) for the prosecution of any antiquarian, historical, literary, scientific, medical, chi-
ropractic, artistic, monumental or musical purpose;
(c) for establishing and maintaining libraries;
(d) for supporting any missionary enterprise having for its object the dissemination of
religious or educational instruction in foreign countries;
(e) for promoting temperance or morality in the commonwealth;
(f) for fostering, encouraging or engaging in athletic exercises or yachting;
(g) for encouraging the raising of choice breeds of domestic animals and poultry;
(h) for the association and accommodation of societies of Free Masons, Odd Fellows,
Knights of Pythias or other charitable or social bodies of a like character and purpose;
(i) for the establishment and maintenance of places for reading rooms, libraries or
social meetings;
(j) for establishing boards of trade, chambers of commerce and bodies of like nature;
(k) for providing nonprofit credit counseling services, as defined in section four A;
(1) for encouraging agriculture or horticulture; for improving and ornamenting the
streets and public squares of any city or town by planting and cultivating ornamental
trees therein and also otherwise improving the physical aspects of such city or town
and furthering the recreation and enjoyment of the inhabitants thereof.
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of persons.6 4 Charitable corporations, therefore, are a type of non-
profit corporation. In some states the nonprofit corporation statute
sets forth a distinct set of provisions governing charitable corpora-
tions. The California nonprofit corporation statute, for example,
contains three separate regulatory schemes, each of which corre-
sponds to different corporate purposes. Public benefit corporations
must be formed for public or charitable purposes-not for the pri-
vate gain of any person-and are not permitted to distribute gains.
Religious corporations must be organized primarily or exclusively
for religious purposes and not for the private gain of any person.
Mutual benefit corporations are defined as any other nonprofit cor-
poration that does not make distributions to members except upon
dissolution, and that operates to provide social, economic, political,
psychological, or other benefits to its members.6 5
B. Provisions for Institutional Control and Accountability in
Charitable Corporations
A careful examination of nonprofit corporation statutes as
they apply to health care institutions reveals that their provisions
place minimal constraints upon management in comparison to for-
profit or business corporation statutes. The nonprofit statutes offer
few incentives for the board of directors to direct corporate man-
agement and virtually no penalties for boards that fail to exercise
their responsibilities to control the activities of the institution.
Furthermore, the statutes provide substantial encouragement for
boards to create self-perpetuating structures, which often are con-
trolled by management.
An examination of the provisions of four prototype stat-
utes-the nonprofit corporation statutes in California, New York,
Massachusetts, and Ohio-supports these conclusions. This section
compares these nonprofit corporation statutes with parallel provi-
sions of the business corporation statutes in the same jurisdictions.
Specifically, the Article focuses its comparison on the provisions of
each statute addressing the existence and rights of shareholders
and members, the procedures for electing and removing directors,
the procedures for determining the composition and size of the
64. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). See Congregational Church v.
Attorney Gen., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2760, 2764-65, 381 N.E.2d 1305, 1307-08 (1978); In re
Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 57-58, 306 N.E.2d 203, 227-28 (1973); Barrett v. Brooks Hosp., Inc., 338
Mass. 754, 758-62, 157 N.E.2d 638, 640-42 (1959).
65. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5110-6910, 7110-8910, 9110-9690 (West Supp. 1981). See also
1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 567, as amended by 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 724.
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board, and the authority of the board to delegate its responsibili-
ties to outsiders.
The four jurisdictions examined in this comparison represent
the four major typologies among nonprofit corporation statutes.
The California statute delineates a comprehensive approach to de-
fining a nonprofit corporation's rights and obligations. This ap-
proach departs from the Model Act in several respects, principally
in that it establishes separate statutory schemes for religious, pub-
lic benefit, and mutual benefit nonprofit corporations."8 The New
York statute, while structurally similar to the California law in
that it is a comprehensive statute departing from the Model Act,
does not systematically categorize nonprofit corporations and re-
sembles an enabling act more than a regulatory scheme.6 7 The
Ohio statute represents those statutes that substantially follow the
Model Act. Massachusetts, on the other hand, is analyzed as a pro-
totype statute because it neither substantially follows the Model
Act nor provides a comprehensive framework for regulating non-
profit corporations.6 8
1. The Role of Shareholders and Members
The most salient distinction between business and nonprofit
corporation statutes derives from a comparison of the roles of
shareholders and members in their respective entities. In business
corporations the shareholders own the corporation's assets, and
modern corporation statutes accordingly provide shareholders with
66. The division of typologies used in this Article is similar to the one proposed in
Note, Membership Rights in Nonprofit Corporations: A Need for Increased Legal Recogni-
tion and Protection, 29 VAND. L. Rxv. 747, 752 (1976). The Note proposes to divide statutes
among those consolidated acts that follow the Model Act, those consolidated acts not com-
parable to the Model Act, and business codes that incorporate provisions for nonprofits.
This Article, however, makes a further distinction among those consolidated statutes in
which the acts are not comparable to the Model Act. Consolidated statutes that do not
follow the Act include those such as California's, which more systematically delineate sub-
categories of nonprofit corporations, and those such as New York's, which make fewer
distinctions.
67. Enabling acts primarily authorize the organization and administration of a corpo-
ration and define its relationship to the state. Regulatory schemes tend to include provisions
that prohibit or restrict certain corporate activities and impose upon the corporation affirm-
ative obligations to the public. See ABA MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION AcT, supra note
61, at ix.
68. The discussion in this Article omits an analysis of the "afterthought" jurisdictions;
namely, those jurisdictions that incorporate the nonprofit corporation provisions in a busi-
ness corporation statute. Id. at 753-54. The omission is due to the fact that such provisions
furnish a limited amount of data for analysis and that the Massachusetts statute reflects
many of the same issues as "afterthought" statutes.
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certain rights attaching to ownership status. These rights include
approval of dissolutions, mergers, consolidations, and sale of all or
a large part of the corporate assets; selection and removal of direc-
tors; inspection of the corporate books and records for legitimate
purposes; and right of derivative actions under specific circum-
stances for certain types of corporate injuries.6 9
In a nonprofit corporation members may perform functions
similar to those of shareholders in a business corporation. The
statutes typically define members as those persons who acquire
membership status in accordance with the provisions of the corpo-
rate charter (articles of incorporation) or the bylaws.70 Members
have rights similar to those of shareholders except that members
do not own the assets of a charitable corporation. Accordingly,
members do not receive payment upon dissolution, nor do they
have the right to dissent and receive payment when the corpora-
tion votes either to undertake a major reorganization or to sell its
assets.
The typical nonprofit corporation statute, however, does not
require all corporations to have members. In particular, the chari-
table corporation, a category encompassing most hospitals and
other nonprofit health care institutions,7 1 need not provide for
members.72 A corporation that chooses not to have members typi-
cally empowers the board of directors to approve any action for
which the statute requires approval of the membership.73 In this
69. N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 87-101 (2d ed. 1971).
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 2(e) (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT
CORP. LAW § 102(a)(9) (McKinney 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.01(H) (Page 1978). In
California members are defined by statute as persons who have certain minimal voting
rights or persons who are designated as members by either the articles of incorporation or
the bylaws-so long as these persons have voting rights with respect to amendments to the
articles or bylaws. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5056 (West Supp. 1981).
71. In Massachusetts, as in many states, hospitals and other nonprofit health care cor-
porations are charitable corporations. Barrett v. Brooks Hosp., Inc., 338 Mass. 754, 758-62,
157 N.E.2d 638, 640-42 (1959). New York corporations that are imbued with charitable pur-
poses such as promoting health are designated "Type B" corporations. N.Y. NOT-FoR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 1970). In California, nonprofit hospitals and other
health care institutions qualify as "public benefit corporations." A "public benefit corpora-
tion" is a charitable corporation. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5060, 5111 (West Supp. 1981).
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5310 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §
601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1702.04(B), .14 (Page 1978). In
Massachusetts a nonprofit corporation need not have members, although certain individuals
must perform the functions of members. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, §§ 2(e), 3 (West
Supp. 1981). But since the individuals performing the functions of members may be the
same persons as the directors of the corporation, however, separate bodies within the corpo-
rate governance structure in effect are eliminated. Id.
73. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5310(b)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
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regard, California provides that rights and privileges of members
vest in the board.74 Moreover, the California scheme treats a cor-
poration in which the board is coterminous with the membership
as a nonmembership corporation. 5
The rationale for omitting a membership in nonprofit corpo-
rations often is based on the absence of an ownership interest in
the assets of the corporation. The analogy between shareholders
and members is said to be imperfect, at least in the case of charita-
ble corporations, because members have no need to protect their
individual investments in the corporation;76 the rights of share-
holders are so intimately tied to their ownership interests that it is
often difficult in drafting legislation to segregate the oversight
function from the obligations regarding preservation of assets.
Moreover, a membership requirement would undermine the poten-
tial for a single substantial donor to exercise control over the con-
duct of a charitable corporation's activities. The legislative drafters
may wish to defer to the interests of these substantial donors on
the ground that protecting the donors' dominion is a legitimate
legislative goal. 7
When a jurisdiction permits a nonprofit corporation to have
no members, the role of corporate owners may be fulfilled by the
state attorney general. Jurisdictions often authorize the attorney
general to bring an action to enforce any right that would reside in
a member of a charitable corporation that actually had members.7 8
The attorney general's task as an enforcer of membership rights
requires a substantial commitment of personnel in order to super-
vise adequately the assets of charitable corporations, since by all
accounts these assets add up to tens of billions of dollars.7 In the
past, the personnel commitments in the various attorneys general's
74. Id. § 5310(b).
75. Id. § 5310(c).
76. Ellman, supra note 52, at 157-58.
77. Andrews, Procedures for Electing Directors of Nonprofit Corporations Pursuant
to the New Nonprofit Corporation Law, 13 U. S.F. L. Rav. 857, 864-65 (1979).
78. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFrr CoRP. LAW § 112(a)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
79. Estimates of the precise dollar amount of the assets held by nonprofit corporations
are difficult to obtain. Most estimates do not segregate corporate assets from assets held by
other nonprofit organizations. Annual giving to charitable organizations generally was esti-
mated at $30 to $40 billion in the late 1970s. One study found that in 1974 receipts of
charitable nonprofits totalled over $80 billion. See generally Abrams, Regulating Char-
ity-The State's Role, 35 Record of the Bar of the City of New York 481-87 (Nov. 1980);
Ellman, supra note 52, at 163; Oleck, Nature of the Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, supra
note 40, at 965-69.
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offices have not kept pace with the enormity of the task.80
The advantage of the attorneys general's enforcer role lies in
the wide range of additional jurisdiction granted to attorneys gen-
eral over charitable corporations. They have broad powers to in-
vestigate and bring actions to determine matters such as whether
the public has been defrauded by the corporation, whether the cor-
poration is fulfilling its charitable purpose, and whether the direc-
tors and officers are fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion."1 This expansion of the statutory powers of the attorneys
general seems to be accompanied by an awareness that the charita-
ble supervisory staffs of various attorney general offices need to, in-
crease in size.2
For two reasons, however, the enforcement activities of the at-
torneys general cannot replace the exercise of membership rights
in a corporate governance structure. First, even a vigorous and
well-staffed regulatory body will be further removed from the
events that give rise to enforcement activities than would be a
group of corporate members. Members maintain an ongoing rela-
tionship with the monitored institutions, and the availability of
even minimal rights of membership creates an opportunity to de-
tect malfeasance. Second, an attorney general directs most of his
efforts toward the preservation of corporate assets. His responsibil-
ities do not include overseeing substantive corporate policies.
Membership rights thus connote a broader range of interests than
those with which an attorney general can adequately deal, includ-
ing the collective power to select and remove directors and ulti-
mately to control the direction of institutional policies and
programs.83
Moreover, the overriding significance of providing for mem-
bers in a corporate governance structure lies in the maintenance of
a balance of power. The existence of a third group in a corporate
structure-even a group with minimal duties-permits the organi-
zation to maintain a buffer between the dual power groups of man-
80. Abrams, supra note 79, at 485; Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979,
supra note 40, at 969-72.
81. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5223, 5225-5226, 5236-5237, 5241-5242, 5250, 5913,
6010, 6510-6511, 6611, 6716 (West Supp. 1981).
82. Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, supra note 40, at 485.
83. The argument here assumes that membership rights roughly parallel the rights of
shareholders in a business corporation. Unfortunately, the rights of members in membership
corporations are often diminished in comparison to those of shareholders in business corpo-
rations. The need to strengthen the rights of members is addressed in text accompanying
notes 84-112 infra.
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agement and the board of directors. Whether the members have a
direct pecuniary interest in the preservation of corporate assets is
immaterial. The incidents of ownership in a business normally in-
clude the right to perform certain institutional functions such as
the collective right to elect and remove directors, the right to in-
spect corporate books and records under certain circumstances,
and standing to sue corporate officers and directors derivatively for
'wrongs inflicted upon the corporation. These activities do not just
determine the profitability of an entity; they also set the direction
of corporate policy. These functions need to be performed by an
independent body, even when that body must be made up of per-
sons who are not the actual owners of the corporate assets.
2. Termination of Membership Rights
Even if a nonprofit charitable corporation chooses to have
members, the composition of the membership may be relatively
unstable because the statutory right to remain a member is tenu-
ous at best. In New York, for example, membership status in non-
profit corporations may be defined by the provisions of the certifi-
cate of incorporation or the corporate bylaws. s4 If the corporation
defines the qualifications for membership in the bylaws, a change
in the composition of the membership may be effected by the rela-
tively simple process of amending the bylaws. s5 Bylaws may be
amended by a vote of the members entitled to vote in an election
of directors or by the board of directors.8 6 An amendment adopted
by the board may be further amended or repealed by the members,
but the statute does not require the subsequent approval of the
membership.87
In New York individual memberships may be terminated by
expulsion.8 The nonprofit corporation statute omits a definition of
84. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 102(a)(9) (McKinney 1970). But see In re
Adelson, N.Y.L.J. at 12 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, Pt. 1, Nov. 26, 1976). A member whose status
derives solely from the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws without any specific mem-
bership rights may be treated merely as an "honorific" member.
85. Note that members of the public at large are not entitled to membership in a
corporation, even when the corporate purpose is to benefit the public. People v. Holstein
Friesian Assoc., 41 Hun 439, 441 (1866).
86. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 602(b) (McKinney 1970). The statute also per-
mits a governmental body regulating an entity to amend or repeal a bylaw to the extent
provided in its statutory authorization. Id. § 602(d).
87. Id. § 602(c). If a bylaw change regulates an impending election, however, it must
be set forth in the notice of the next membership meeting held for the purpose of electing
directors. Id. § 602(e).
88. Id. § 601(e).
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expulsion, but courts have implied a requirement that in the ab-
sence of express procedures in the certificate or bylaws members
may be expelled only by a vote of the membership.89 The absence
of clear statutory criteria and processes for expelling members has
attracted the public's attention and led to recent legislative re-
forms. For example, California has enacted new statutory provi-
sions requiring expulsions, suspensions, or terminations to be un-
dertaken in good faith and in a fair and reasonable manner.90 The
statute, which details a procedure that complies with these fairness
requirements, requires notice and an opportunity to respond, and
includes specific provisions for judicial review.9 1
3. Voting Rights
The voting rights of members in charitable corporations do
not receive the same protection afforded shareholder voting rights
in business corporations. Typically, both members and sharehold-
ers vote to approve major corporate reorganizations, approve disso-
lutions and sales of part or all of the corporate assets, amend the
charter (articles of incorporation) or bylaws, and select and remove
directors.9 An individual member, though, stands less chance than
a shareholder to be granted the full range of voting rights and to
retain the voting rights initially extended to him.9
In a New York business corporation at least one class of share-
holders or bondholders must retain full voting rights if another
class of shareholders is to be either denied voting rights or ex-
tended only limited voting rights." A shareholder whose voting
rights are limited or denied by an amendment to the certificate
(articles) of incorporation occurring after he purchased his shares
89. Weinberg v. Carton, 196 Misc. 74, 90 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
90. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5341 (West Supp. 1981).
91. Id.
92. See note 69 supra. See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, §§ 6, 10, 10A, 11 (West
Supp. 1981); MAss. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
93. Nonprofit corporation statutes offer limited protection to the voting rights of
members. See Note, supra note 66, at 755-64. The author notes that members who challenge
statutory provisions and bylaws permitting a limitation or denial of member voting rights
have met with practically no success. Id. at 756.
94. N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAw §§ 501(a), 613(a) (McKinney 1970). At common law each
shareholder was entitled to one vote. Although modem corporation statutes have modified
the rule by permitting cumulative voting, nonvoting shares, and voting in proportion to the
number of shares held, business corporation statutes often recite the modified common-law
rule; namely, that each share is entitled to one vote subject to modifications set forth in the
corporate charter. See N. LATrIN, supra note 69, § 89.
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may dissent and receive payment for his shares.9 5 Furthermore, a
modification in voting rights must be undertaken through an
amendment to the certificate of incorporation, a procedure that re-
quires a majority vote of all outstanding shares entitled to vote on
a certificate amendment. 6
In New York charitable corporations at least one class of
members must retain full voting rights in order for the corporation
to limit or deny the voting rights of other classes. 97 Nevertheless,
charitable corporations may limit or deny existing voting rights
more easily than business corporations, since the modification in
voting rights may be achieved either by an amendment to the by-
laws or by a resolution of the board of directors if such a resolution
is permitted in the bylaws.98 Bylaws may be amended either by the
members entitled to vote in an election of directors or by the
board, unless the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws adopted
by the members prohibit board-adopted amendments.9 9 If voting
rights are stated in the certificate and an amendment proposes to
limit or deny the voting rights of a class, however, the amendment
gives rise to automatic voting rights on the part of the adversely
affected class.100
While New York thus offers only somewhat diminished pro-
tection of members' voting rights in a charitable corporation com-
pared to that afforded the rights of shareholders, Massachusetts
permits relatively easy member disenfranchisement. Member vot-
ing rights may be designated either in the articles or in the corpo-
rate bylaws,101 but no single class of members needs to have full
voting rights. The bylaws may be amended by the members, or by
the directors if the bylaws so permit,102 and the proportion of
members required to amend the bylaws may be set forth in the
articles or bylaws. 103 If a bylaw amendment is proposed that would
disenfranchise or further limit the voting rights of a particular
95. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 804(a)(1), 806(b)(6) (MeKinney Supp. 1980).
96. Id. §§ 612(a), 803.
97. N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFrr CORP. LAw § 612 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
98. Id. § 601(b) (McKinney 1970).
99. Id. § 602(b). Amendments adopted by the board may be subsequently adopted or
repealed by the members, although the board is not required to present the amendment for
member approval, but is required to notice certain provisions. Id. § 602(c).
100. Id. § 802(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
101. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 3 (West Supp. 1981).
102. Id. § 6A; id. ch. 156B, § 17. The board-amended bylaws must be included in the
general notice for the next shareholders' meeting following the board's action, and the
shareholders are entitled to further amend or repeal the board-adopted amendment.
103. Id. ch. 180, § 6A; id. ch. 156B, § 8(a) (West 1970).
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class, the affected class does not acquire an automatic right to vote
on the amendment.' In contrast, the Massachusetts business cor-
poration statute provides that a limitation of voting rights must be
set forth in the articles of incorporation.105 Moreover, an amend-
ment to the articles requires at least a two-thirds vote of each class
of outstanding stock entitled to vote on the matter.10 6
Similarly, the California business corporation statute generally
requires that limitations on voting rights of a class be set forth in
the articles of incorporation,0 7 but limitations on voting rights in a
nonprofit corporation may be contained in the articles or the by-
laws.108 The California nonprofit corporation statute does improve
upon many statutory schemes, however, because under the Califor-
nia scheme a class of members whose rights may be adversely af-
fected by a proposed bylaw amendment acquires automatic voting
rights on the proposal without regard to any limitations contained
in the bylaws.10
Ohio offers near parity between the status of shareholders' and
members' voting rights. Ohio appears to permit voting rights to be
altered through an amendment to the articles of incorporation or
the corporate regulations (bylaws), regardless of whether the cor-
poration is for-profit or nonprofit. 1 0 Moreover, Ohio will not per-
104. Jessie v. Boynton, 372 Mass. 293, 361 N.E.2d 1267 (1977). The court in Jessie
held that the nonprofit corporation statute does not require a separate class vote for any
amendment to the articles in which the rights of a class are adversely affected.
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, §§ 13(a)(5), 26,41 (West 1970).
106. Id. § 71. The Massachusetts business corporation statute adds a provision that
gives rise to automatic voting rights for a class adversely affected by an amendment to the
articles of incorporation, regardless of the extent of voting rights granted to the class by the
articles. Id. § 77. The nonprofit corporation statute does not allow for automatic voting
rights to be extended to an adversely affected class.
107. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 400(a), 700(a) (West 1977).
108. Id. § 5610 (West Supp. 1981).
109. Id. § 5813. The recent amendments to the California nonprofit corporation stat-
ute appear to prohibit a denial of voting rights altogether in public benefit corporations. A
member is defined in the statute as a person who has the right to vote in the election of a
director or to vote to dissolve or reorganize the corporation, even if the articles of incorpora-
tion do not designate this person as a member. A member is further defined as one who is
designated as a member in the articles and who also has voting rights on amendments to the
articles. Id. § 5056(a); see Andrews, supra note 77, at 862-64. As a result, every statutory
member must possess some voting rights. California also provides for a type of membership
that is not designated by statute. A person could have some or all of the rights of members
and even be referred to as a "member" without acquiring statutory "member" designation.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5056(b) (West Supp. 1981). These provisions may give rise to a two-class
membership system, which enables a small number of participants in the organizational
structure to maintain substantial control.
110. 12 OHIO JUR. 3D Business Relationships § 558 (1979).
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mit the trustees (directors) of a nonprofit corporation to amend
the regulations without the approval of members."'
Notwithstanding Ohio's apparent consistency, the crux of the
matter is that as a general rule shareholder voting rights in a busi-
ness corporation are created in the charter (articles of incorpora-
tion), and amendments to the charter usually require the approval
of a significant majority of the shareholders. Nonprofit corporation
statutes, as applied to charitable corporations, however, typically
permit voting rights to be defined in the bylaws. The bylaws gener-
ally may be amended by the board of directors or by member votes
of a lesser proportion than the majorities required for shareholders
in a business corporation.
The relative ease with which voting rights may be abrogated in
nonprofit corporations reflects the fact that voting rights are inti-
mately connected with ownership rights. In business corporations a
shareholder whose voting rights are limited or denied after he ac-
quires the shares and without his assent may often dissent and re-
ceive payment for his shares.1 2 In a nonprofit charitable corpora-
tion the members do not have a proprietary interest in the assets
of the corporation, and the provisions of nonprofit corporation
statutes fail to differentiate between policy issues pertaining to
ownership interests and those that are directed toward necessary
corporate governance functions. The selection and removal of di-
rectors, considered below, is one such governance function that is
critical to the establishment of institutional policy direction. The
absence of members' direct ownership interest in a nonprofit chari-
table corporation does not obviate the need for maintaining the
membership franchise.
4. Election of Directors
In a nonprofit charitable corporation the board of directors
may be self-perpetuating because the corporation has no members.
In a nonmembership corporation the authority to replace directors
resides in the board itself."" Moreover, even when the corporation
has members, the voting rights of the membership may be rather
tenuous." 4 Even assuming a corporation has a membership with
relatively stable voting rights, however, a question arises regarding
111. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1702.38(C), (E). See Veterans of World War I v. Levy,
118 N.E.2d 670 (Ohio App. 1954).
112. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 92-112 supra and accompanying text.
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the scope of the members' authority to elect the corporate
directors.
In a business corporation the shareholders who possess voting
rights typically elect the directors. 1 5 In a nonprofit corporation the
authority of the voting members to elect directors may be under-
mined by statutory provisions permitting designation of directors.
In California, for example, directors of business corporations are
elected by a plurality of the shares of shareholders who are entitled
to vote and serve one year terms.'" At least one class of sharehold-
ers or bondholders must retain full voting rights-including the
right to elect directors."17
In California nonprofit charitable corporations, directors are
elected at an annual meeting by the members entitled to vote"18
and serve for one year unless the bylaws or articles of incorpora-
tion provide for other terms of up to three years in length."9 Not
all directors, however, must be elected. Up to one-third of the di-
rectors in a membership corporation, as well as all or any portion
of the directors of a nonmembership corporation, may be desig-
nated in accordance with the provisions of the articles or the by-
laws.' 0 Moreover, any person designated as a director by an
elected officer of the corporation becomes a member of the board
apparently without regard to the one-third rule.''
5. Size and Composition of the Board of Directors
The size and composition of a nonprofit charitable corpora-
tion's board of directors often can be changed with relative ease.
Massachusetts permits the size and composition of the board to be
set forth in the corporation's articles or bylaws.'22 If the bylaws
115. In closely held business corporations shareholders may, however, delegate the au-
thority to elect directors to designated persons or shareholders. A discussion of the statutory
basis and rationale for such practice is set forth in Part III, section B(6) infra.
116. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301, 600(b), 708(c) (West 1977).
117. Id. § 400(a).
118. Id. § 5510(b) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
119. Id. § 5220(a).
120. 'Id. § 5520(d).
121. Id. § 5220(e); see Andrews, supra note 77, at 864. It should be noted that not-
withstanding any other provision of the California nonprofit corporation code, no more than
49% of the directors of a California nonprofit public benefit corporation may be "interested
persons." Interested persons are individuals who receive compensation, other than director-
ate fees, from the corporation, or who are related to a person receiving this compensation.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (West Supp. 1981).
122. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, §§ 3, 6A (West Supp. 1981); cf. id. ch. 156B,
33 13, 16 (West 1970) (similar provisions regarding for-profit corporations).
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govern the board size and composition, modifications may be
achieved rather simply.123 In many states, bylaws may be amended
by the board of directors without subsequent ratification by the
members.2 4
The Ohio nonprofit corporation statute permits less flexibility
than many other statutes. That statute requires that an Ohio non-
profit corporation have at least three trustees (directors). Unless
the articles of incorporation state a fixed number of trustees or
provide for a method for voting members to determine such a
number, the number may be fixed or changed only by the voting
members at a meeting called for the purpose of electing trustees. A
change in the number of trustees cannot have the effect of shorten-
ing the term of any incumbent trustees.12 5 Ohio, however, does per-
mit a board to designate ex-officio trustees, and, if the articles or
bylaws permit, these ex-officio trustees may have voting rights. 6
6. Delegation of Directors' Authority
At common law corporate decisionmaking was a responsibility
of the board of directors. The directors could delegate authority to
officers of the corporation, but the ultimate responsibility for su-
pervising the managerial activity resided in the board.1 27 Most cor-
poration statutes adopt this common-law concept, and courts have
been reluctant to recognize any form of management agreement
that would undermine the authority of the board of directors.128
Management agreements may be executed with other companies,
which then take over managerial responsibilities, or they may be
executed with individuals such as shareholders, who perform the
management functions without the usual board approval.1 29
123. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
124. The extent of the board's power to amend the bylaws of a nonprofit corporation
is illustrated in Harris v. Board of Directors, 55 Ill. App. 3d 392, 370 N.E.2d 1121 (1977).
The members of the corporation adopted a proposal to remove all the directors. In response
to the proposed resolution the board of directors amended the corporate bylaws to permit
the board to elect its own membership and to limit the voting rights of members. The court
upheld the bylaw amendment because the Illinois nonprofit corporation statute empowered
the board to amend the bylaws.
125. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.27(A)(1)-(2) (Page 1978).
126. Id. § 1702.27(A)(4).
127. N. LATTI, supra note 69, §§ 69, 73.
128. Id. §§ 73-74.
129. For example, shareholders may provide that certain individuals will hold posi-
tions as corporate officers to whom salaries are guaranteed; that certain shareholders have
disproportionate decisionmaking authority over specified matters; or that shareholder ap-
proval is required for matters that are typically within the purview of the board of directors.
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Nonprofit and business corporation statutes address the ex-
tent to which the board of directors' authority to manage the cor-
poration may be delegated to board committees, management com-
panies, and designated shareholders. Nonprofit corporation
statutes are very similar to business corporation statutes in terms
of the board's power to delegate its authority to executive and
other board committees. Both types of statutes generally authorize
broad delegation to these committees and reserve for the entire
board only such powers as the authority to fill vacancies, alter the
bylaws, appoint committees, and approve self-dealing transactions
and major corporate reorganizations. 130 Typically, however, these
statutes do provide that the committee structure must function
under the ultimate direction of the board.
The provisions of business corporation statutes governing del-
egation of board authority to individuals or groups who are not
board members have been expanded recently to allow for even
more extensive delegation. Closely held business corporations may
under certain circumstances delegate the entire management func-
tion of the board to outsiders.131 The liberalization of delegation
authority in closely held business corporations seems to have had a
pervasive effect upon some drafters of nonprofit corporation stat-
utes. Unfortunately, the rationale for permitting broad delegation
of authority in closely held corporations cannot be applied consist-
ently to similar delegation in nonprofit corporations.
The New York statutory scheme typifies this trend towards a
generalized liberalization of delegable authority that fails to re-
spond to the variances in policy considerations between nonprofit
corporations and closely held for-profit corporations. The New
York for-profit corporation statute states that the business of the
corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board, sub-
ject to certain exceptions including the delegation of authority as
permitted under special provisions applicable to closely held cor-
porations.3 2 The certificate of incorporation may restrict the
board's duty to manage a business corporation, or it may under
certain conditions permit a shareholder to manage some or all of
the corporation's activities. The delegation must, however, be au-
thorized by all the shareholders and be accompanied by notice to
transferees. None of the shares of stock may be listed on a national
130. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 311, 5212(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
131. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 620(b), 701 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-
1981).
132. Id. § 701.
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exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market, and
the existence of the arrangement must be conspicuously noted on
every share. The directors of the corporation are relieved of liabil-
ity for their own actions, but the shareholders who authorize the
arrangement must assume the liability of directors.'
Nonprofit corporations in New York may also delegate the au-
thority of the board to any person or management company if per-
mitted by the articles of incorporation.' At first glance, manage-
ment companies appear to be placed in a position similar to
corporate officers who act under the direction of the board. In fact,
it appears that management companies operating a New York non-
profit corporation may take on the same independence allowed a
management company in a closely held corporation. The realities
of not having a membership to determine whether the board is su-
pervising the management company create possible areas of abuse.
More importantly, however, New York's nonprofit corporation
statute undermines the board's power of "ultimate direction" over
the management company by providing that the persons to whom
the corporation management responsibilities are delegated are sub-
ject to the same obligations and liabilities as the directors.3 5 This
provision permits the management company to take on the respon-
sibilities of directors in lieu of the board. It appears also to permit
the certificate of incorporation to immunize the board from
liability when a management company has assumed these
responsibilities.
California also permits shareholders in closely held business
corporations to execute management agreements, even if the agree-
ments interfere with the discretion of the board or turn the corpo-
ration into, an unincorporated partnership."" The statute carefully
defines close corporations as corporations having no more than ten
shareholders of record among all classes of their issued shares.3 7
Many of the other restrictions placed upon the delegation of board
authority to outsiders by the New York statute are similar to those
imposed upon a California close corporation implementing a share-
133. Id. §§ 620(b)-(g).
134. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 701(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
135. Id. § 701(b).
136. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 1981). By contrast, Ohio prohibits delega-
tion of board functions in nonprofit charitable corporations to a management company. 6
OHIO JUR. 3d Associations § 397 (1978); cf. State v. Conn, 115 Ohio St. 607, 614-15, 155 N.E.
138, 140 (1927) (for-profit insurance corporation).
137. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
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holder agreement. In particular, the shareholders participating in
the arrangement become liable as if they were directors. 38
California likewise allows nonprofit public benefit corporations
to delegate the management of the corporation to management
companies.119 The activities and affairs of the nonprofit corpora-
tion, as well as all corporate powers, must be exercised under the
ultimate direction of the board.14 0 Unlike the New York statute,
however, the California statute clearly imposes liability upon the
directors themselves. 1 Thus, the board of directors must continue
to supervise actively the management company.
An argument can be made that permitting management agree-
ments in closely held corporations serves legislative policy goals. It
decreases the regulatory impact of business corporation statutes on
small, owner-operated corporations.4 2 If the number of investors is
limited, if the investors agree that certain board functions should
be delegated, and if the public is not adversely affected by that
decision, the potential for misuse of corporate authority is of little
consequence to the public.
The public investment in health care institutions, on the other
hand, is enormous,"13 and the interest of taxpayers and consumers
in the proper management of health care institutions is therefore
substantial. This statutory scheme, when applied to health care in-
stitutions, allows directors effectively to escape liability for their
actions through the delegation of authority, and can only serve to
diminish director supervision thereby impeding effective corporate
management and accountability. As noted above, however, the
residual effect of liberalizing management control provisions of
business corporation statutes apparently has been the concomitant
liberalization of nonprofit corporation statutes without the accom-
panying constraints that limit the application of these provisions
to small, closely held corporations.
138. Id. § 300(d).
139. Id. § 5210 (West Supp. 1981).
140. Id.
141. Id. §§ 5210, 5230-5238.
142. See Berger, California's New General Corporation Law: Close and Closely-Held
Corporations, 7 PAC. L.J. 585 (1976).
143. See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text.
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C. Liability of Directors: The Adequacy of Existing Procedural
Devices
1. Statutory Provisions
The final issue to be explored in this part of the Article is
whether nonprofit corporation statutes provide adequate procedu-
ral devices for imposing liability upon directors who have breached
their fiduciary duties to the corporation. The derivative suit may
be used by shareholders in business corporations in certain circum-
stances to recover damages for an injury to the corporation, such
as an injury caused by the breach of the directors' fiduciary du-
ties.144 A derivative suit must be brought in the name of the corpo-
ration, and recovery generally lies in favor of the corporation
rather than the shareholder.1 4 5
Generally, nonprofit corporation statutes and rules of civil
procedure have not addressed adequately the procedural issues
that arise during an action to impose liability on the directors of
nonprofit corporations. In those jurisdictions that have considered
the issue at all, procedural devices are often delineated in a patch-
work quilt of statutory provisions. For example, rule 23.1 of the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure engrafts the phrase "or
member" onto the term "shareholder" when describing the proce-
dure for bringing derivative actions.1 46 The Massachusetts non-
profit corporation statute neither provides specific linkages be-
tween the civil procedure rules and the body of corporate law nor
defines the scope of duties of nonprofit directors.147 In the Massa-
chusetts business corporation statute, however, specific provisions
address the fiduciary duties of a director and the remedies availa-
ble to assure performance of these duties. 48
In Ohio a provision of the nonprofit corporation statute states
that trustees (directors) are liable for damages to the corporation
when they engage in certain activities, such as making loans to of-
144. Shareholders sometimes may bring direct actions against the corporation as well,
when a duty owed directly to a shareholder is breached. Also, the shareholder may bring a
direct action to enjoin the corporation from performing some action that would cause it to
exceed its purposes and powers.
145. See N. LATTIN, supra note 69, §§ 104-106.
146. MASS. R. Civ. P. 23.1. One could question whether any person has standing to
bring derivative actions in Massachusetts in the situation in which the corporation chooses
to have no members and decides instead to have directors perform certain membership
functions when required by statute.
147. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 10A (West Supp. 1981).
148. Id. ch. 156B, §§ 46, 60-65 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981).
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ficers, trustees, or members that are not in the usual course of the
corporation's affairs or in compliance with the provisions of the ar-
ticles. 149 Even so, neither the nonprofit corporation statute nor the
civil procedure rules provide for the enforcement of that provision
by members in the event that the corporation fails to enforce its
rights against trustees. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure author-
ize derivative actions by shareholders, but it appears this rule does
not apply to members of nonprofit corporations. 150
2. Judicially Created Devices
(a) Derivative suits
Legislatures often fail to provide appropriate procedural de-
vices for bringing derivative actions on behalf of nonprofit corpora-
tions, a failure that in turn creates an awkward vacuum for the
courts. In Governing Board v. Pannill,15' for example, a member of
The Texas Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, a
nonprofit corporation, brought a derivative action against the cor-
poration alleging an ultra vires act. The nonprofit corporation stat-
ute in Texas expressly authorizes derivative suits in cases alleging
ultra vires actions on the part of the corporation.152 The procedural
prerequisites for bringing such an action, however, are set forth
neither in the state's nonprofit corporation statute nor in its rules
of civil procedure. The business corporation statute, on the other
hand, does state the requirements for a derivative suit. The court
ultimately borrowed case law and procedural requirements from
the business corporation statute, including proof of a demand upon
the corporation or the futility of such a demand. 153
While many courts permit the members of nonprofit corpora-
tions to bring an equitable action in the form of a derivative suit,
legislative resolution would avoid the uncertainty created by a ju-
dicial adoption of the business corporation statutes and civil proce-
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.55(B) (Page 1978).
150. OHIO R. Civ. P. 23.1; 6 OHIO JUR. 3d Associations § 49 n.71 (1979). But see In re
Cleveland Say. Soc'y, 90 Ohio Op. 2d 399, 183 N.E.2d 234 (1962).
151. 561 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
152. TEX. CORP. CODE ANN. tit. 32, § 1396-2.03(b)(2) (Vernon 1980).
153. 561 S.W.2d at 524-25. See also Atwell v. Bide-A-Wee Home Assoc., 59 Misc. 2d
321, 299 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Texas Soc'y v. Fort Bend Chapter, 590 S.W.2d 156
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979). The New York Court in Atwell held that members of a nonprofit
corporation had standing to bring a derivative action by analogizing members to sharehold-
ers, for whom the business corporation statute authorized a derivative action. Subsequently,
New York amended the nonprofit corporation statute to provide expressly that derivative
actions could be brought by members of nonprofit corporations.
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dure rules intended for proprietary corporations.1" For example,
to prevent frivolous actions, the New York statute requires that at
least five percent of any class of members or capital certificate
holders join in a derivative action. 155 Such a provision is tailored to
the needs of nonprofit organizations. A measured legislative re-
sponse would clarify the right of a nonprofit corporation member
to bring such an action and would also adapt the procedural re-
quirements to the specific needs of nonprofit corporations.
(b) The Breach of a Charitable Trust Theory: Stern v. Lucy
Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries
Notwithstanding the difficulties that may be encountered by
members who attempt to bring a derivative action for the breach
of a director's fiduciary duties, some courts have recognized a
cause of action arising from a breach of a charitable trust. Under
this theory nonprofit corporate members may argue that they are
the beneficiaries of an implied charitable trust that has been im-
pressed upon the assets of the charitable corporation.
The decision in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training
School for Deaconesses and Missionaries"" is frequently cited as a
landmark case for the imposition of liability upon nonprofit corpo-
ration directors under the breach of a charitable trust theory.
Plaintiffs, who were patients at defendant hospital, sued the direc-
tors for breaching various fiduciary duties. Several hospital direc-
tors were affiliated with various financial institutions in which the
hospital had deposited large sums of money in interest-free ac-
counts. For approximately eighteen years the management of the
hospital was handled almost exclusively by two trustee-officers,
and neither the Finance Committee nor the Investment Committee
of the hospital had met for over ten years. The Board and the Ex-
154. It is especially important to legislate the right of nonprofit corporation members
to bring derivative actions in view of the historical reluctance of courts to interfere in the
internal affairs of nonprofit corporations and to grant standing to nonprofit corporation
members desiring to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. For a thoughtful
discussion of judicial noninterference in the affairs of voluntary or nonprofit associations,
see Maraghy, Internal Control Trends in Nonprofit Organizations, in TRENDS IN NONPROFIrr
ORGANIZATIONS LAW 59-63 (H. Oleck ed. 1977). The problems encountered by members who
attempt to gain standing to sue derivatively are outlined in Note, supra note 66, at 768-74.
See note 66 supra. A primary obstacle to members obtaining standing in the absence of
legislation is that members have no direct pecuniary interest in the corporate assets.
155. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PRoFrr CORP. LAW § 623(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
156. 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
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ecutive Committee of the hospital routinely accepted the recom-
mendations of the two officers. 157
The Stern court found that the individual directors had
breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation through misman-
agement, nonmanagement, and self-dealing. The court set forth a
standard of care that was adapted largely from principles of corpo-
rate liability.151  Under this standard liability for mismanagement
may occur when a director has committed gross negligence or is
otherwise guilty of more than mere mistakes of judgment. 59 Lia-
bility for nonmanagement may arise when a director fails either to
acquire the inforimation necessary to supervise investment policy
or to attend regularly meetings at which such policies are consid-
ered, although a corporate director may delegate the investment
activity per se.160 A director may also be liable for self-dealing if he
fails to disclose interlocking responsibilities or influences the cor-
poration to transact business with a company in which he has a
significant interest or control.161
While the Stern decision has been widely regarded as a poten-
tial threat to boards of nonprofit corporations that do not attend
to their responsibilities, the case actually presents few, if any, ob-
stacles to neglectful directors. For one thing, the relief granted by
the court did not include removal of the directors, a power which
the court may exercise in a breach of trust case. The court instead
ordered that the corporate investment policy be written and ap-
proved by a disinterested board; that each newly elected member
of the board read the court's opinion; that prior to each meeting
the board members receive a corporate financial report; and that
reports of the corporation's auditors be available to the public for
five years.1 6
2
Perhaps more important is that the case has not had the im-
157. Id. at 1007-08.
158. Considerable controversy surrounds the choice of a standard of care to which di-
rectors of charitable corporations may be held. Some argue that as stewards of assets that
are impressed with a charitable trust, trustees should be held to the higher fiduciary stan-
dard of care specifically applicable to trusts. Others argue that they should be liable only for
breaches of the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. The prevailing trend seems to favor
the corporate standard. California recently resolved the controversy legislatively by adding
provisions to its public benefit corporation statute that define the standard of care for direc-
tors of charitable corporations. The standard is largely derived from principles of corporate
liability. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5230-5238 (West Supp. 1981).
159. 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
160. Id. at 1013-14.
161. Id. at 1014-15.
162. Id. at 1020-21.
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pact that many commentators expected. Some courts have not
been willing to imply a charitable trust upon assets of corporations
unless the parties specifically intended to create a trust.163 Fur-
thermore, the theory is applicable only to a trustee's misuse of
trust assets and not to the full range of a corporate director's
fiduciary responsibilities. Finally, since it was decided in 1974, the
Stern case has been relied upon specifically only once for the pro-
position that nonprofit corporation directors may be liable for
breach of fiduciary duties; that decision was issued by a trial
court.
1 6 4
The utility of the Stern case is also limited by authority in
jurisdictions that hold that ultra vires actions must be brought by
way of a quo warranto action and that the attorney general is an
indispensable party in such an action.165 In a jurisdiction following
this rule, a potential plaintiff would have to convince the attorney
general that his case is worthy of prosecution. Moreover, limited
staff resources still might prevent the attorney general's interven-
tion regardless of the merit of the case.
(c) The Corporate Negligence Theory: Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital
The leading case on hospital corporate negligence liability is
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.'" Darling
announced a theory of corporate liability for the failure of a hospi-
tal to establish a system in which nurses would inform the admin-
istration and medical staff of inadequate treatment rendered by a
physician granted hospital privileges. Liability under Darling
arises from the failure of the hospital to review the treatment ren-
dered. The application of a corporate negligence theory does not
depend upon establishing the elements of respondeat superior, but
163. See Note, supra note 66, at 767.
164. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Frank G. Thompson Foundation, 170 N.J. Super. 128,
135, 405 A.2d 866, 870 (1979). The court held that directors of a foundation that is organ-
ized as a charitable corporation are held to a corporate standard of care which permits di-
rectors to delegate authority to supervise investments. The Stern case was distinguished in
Newman v. Forward Lands, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a case in which
the court held that contractors do not have standing to sue directors of nonprofit corpora-
tions with which they contract.
165. See Oleksy v. Sisters of Mercy, 92 Mich. App. 770, 285 N.W.2d 455 (1979); Oleksy
v. Sisters of Mercy, 74 Mich. App. 374, 253 N.W.2d 772 (1977). Contra, Jones v. Grant, 344
So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977); Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932,
40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964).
166. 33 IMI. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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rather exposes the hospital to liability for failing to oversee the
acts of physicians who are not employees.167
The Darling decision represented a departure from previous
doctrine. The expectation was that it would cause hospital direc-
tors to examine their responsibilities to oversee the quality of care
provided within their institution. In the sixteen years since it was
decided, however, the case has never been relied upon specifically
outside of Illinois. 168 As a result of the Darling decision, however,
some courts have given credence to the duty of a hospital to use
reasonable care in granting medical staff privileges, as well as the
duty to terminate or limit staff privileges when the hospital be-
comes aware of the incompetence of a staff physician."6 '
The anticipated impact of Darling upon individual directors
of hospital corporations has not materialized. While a corporation
may be found negligent under a Darling theory, among reported
cases neither a single individual director nor a single board has
been held liable for failing to oversee the granting of staff privi-
leges. Even if the directors were to be held individually responsi-
ble, an extension of the Darling decision would address only one of
the potential fiduciary duties of a director-to avoid financial
losses due to corporate negligence for personally failing to oversee
the quality of care. The board of directors, however, answers to a
broader range of fiduciary obligations, including the duty of loy-
alty, the duty of care in preserving assets, a duty to supervise in-
vestments, and a duty to avoid self-dealing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although this Article has concentrated upon comparing non-
profit and business corporation statutes, it recognizes that corpo-
rate governance mechanisms in the for-profit sector have been sub-
ject to critical scrutiny as well. °70 In small, closely held business
167. Id. at 333.
168. Dunn, Hospital Corporate Liability: The Trend Continues, MEDICOLEGAL NEWS
16 (Oct. 1980), (citing Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980) and Johnson v.
Misrecordia Community Hosp., 97 Wisc. 2d 521, 294 N.W.2d 501 (1980)). Dunn states that
only in the last several years have significant additional strides been taken in the develop-
ment of the Darling theory.
169. Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for
Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385, 414-16 (1975). See also Mitchell County
Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
170. See, e.g., Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGEIS L.
REV. 293 (1979); Moss, The Crises of Corporate Accountability: A Legislator's View, 5 J.
CORP. L. 251 (1978). Mace surveyed corporate directors and chief executive officers in a wide
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corporations, however, an ineffective governance mechanism may
have little, if any, impact upon the public interest, while publicly
held corporations are subjected to federal and state regulations,
ensuring at least a minimal level of accountability to the public.
17 1
Recently, federal regulations and statutes have expanded federal
jurisdiction into areas that relate to strengthening for-profit corpo-
rate governance mechanisms. 172
Nonprofit hospitals and other health care institutions possess
some of the significant characteristics of large, publicly held busi-
ness corporations. Roughly forty-five billion dollars are expended
annually by the consumers of services rendered by voluntary, non-
profit hospitals.77 The share of public funding of hospital care ex-
penditures is rising steadily, and direct public funding now stands
at fifty-six percent of all hospital care expenditures. In addition,
there are other areas of substantial indirect public funding of hos-
pital expenditures, such as lost governmental revenues from tax
exemptions for institutions, tax deductions for personal medical
expenditures, and federal loans and grants. 1
74
The extent of the public's investment as taxpayers-not to
mention as consumers of institutional health care services-makes
it imperative that such health care institutions cultivate systematic
public participation in policymaking activities and make adequate
public disclosure of information concerning their operation and
range of business corporations and found that boards of directors function as an overseer of
management primarily in crisis situations such as when a successor chief executive officer
needs to be replaced. In other policymaking roles business boards take an advisory position
but rarely exercise systematic decisionmaking authority.
171. One such regulatory scheme is found in the authority of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to require full public disclosure of information necessary for potential
investors to make investment decisions. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb
(1976 & Supp. III 1979); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
172. Regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1978
require proxy statements to disclose extensive information about the directors, their rela-
tionship to the corporation, and their participation at board and committee meetings. Upon
the request of a resigning board member, the corporation is also required to file information
with the SEC describing the reasons for the resignee's dissatisfaction with company man-
agement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 6(f). In 1977 Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977. The Act requires publicly held corporations to meet certain internal
accounting standards in order to disclose any activity that might violate the statute. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b) (Supp. III 1979).
173. AMERICAN HosPrrAL AssOCIATION, supra note 18, at 4-7 (1980). The estimate is
conservatively generated by multiplying the percentage of nonprofit, nongovernmental beds
found in nonfederal short-term general and other special hospitals by annual hospital
expenditures.
174. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
[Vol. 34:10291064
NONPROFIT HEALTH INSTITUTIONS
finance. In an environment in which deregulation is gaining popu-
lar support, it is necessary to reexamine corporate governance
mechanisms to determine whether they can ensure representation
of the public's interest.
The analytical exercise undertaken in this Article suggests
that corporate governance mechanisms will require refinements to
achieve these objectives. Insufficient attention has been directed
toward the development of judicial and statutory remedies to en-
force the supervisory role of the boards of directors. The statutory
framework for nonprofit charitable corporations may have contrib-
uted in a substantial way to the trend, noted by other commenta-
tors, of role reversal between management and the board of direc-
tors. In particular, nonprofit corporation statutes do not generally
require memberships, which in turn may create self-perpetuating
boards. In corporations that do establish memberships, voting
rights are abrogated easily through amendments to bylaws and
often through board resolutions. Similarly, categories of member-
ships may be eliminated through bylaw amendments. The rights of
members to bring derivative actions for wrongdoing on the part of
the board have not been developed fully through legislative ave-
nues. Finally, management companies may under some circum-
stances operate without supervision by the board of directors.
The identified deficiencies in nonprofit corporate governance
mechanisms, as they apply to health care institutions, may be cor-
rected in several ways. First, nonprofit health care corporations 1'7 5
should be required to have members, and the qualifications for
membership should be identified in the articles of incorporation
rather than the bylaws. Second, membership rights should include
minimal voting rights, especially the election of the directors.
Third, the right of members to bring derivative actions should be
established in nonprofit corporation statutes, and the statutes
should be amended to define the appropriate procedures required
to maintain derivative suits on behalf of nonprofit corporations.
Fourth, management companies and other delegations of manage-
rial authority should be clearly subject to the supervisory authority
of the board of directors. Last, to ensure a diversified membership
in the corporation that reflects the public interest of taxpayers and
175. Nonprofit health care corporations may be defined as nonprofit corporations en-
gaged in the direct delivery of health care services and receiving patient care revenue in
excess of a dollar amount considered appropriate in the particular jurisdiction. The dollar
limit would function to exclude relatively small nonprofit clinics and group practices, whose
regulation is of lesser concern to the public because government funding is limited.
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consumers, public benefit programs, like Medicare and Medicaid,
should require, as a condition of participation for nonprofit health
care institutions, a membership that at least in part reflects the
population in the area served by the health care institution.7 6 The
members could be appointed in a variety of ways, but the method
chosen should ensure a broad-based representation of the public
served by each institution.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa, 1396a(1)-(43) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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